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DID THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN ELECTORATE 
UNINTENTIONALLY HELP ELECT DONALD TRUMP 
PRESIDENT? 
C. Daniel Chill* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Political scholars generally posit that income inequality is the 
primary cause for considering America to be electorally flawed.1  But, 
in fact, it is race, not wealth, that fundamentally impacts the electoral 
dynamic in the United States, at least during this past decade and more.  
Examples of racially driven electoral influences abound. 
Statistical analysis proves beyond peradventure that Barack 
Obama could not have been twice elected President if not for the 
massive vote he received from the African-American electorate, an 
electorate that clearly is not associated with wealth and can be counted 
among the poorest of American citizenry.  In 2000, Republican dirty 
tricksters used push polling to spread a false rumor that Senator John 
McCain had fathered an illegitimate African-American child.2  That 
same year, Mr. McCain called the Confederate flag a “symbol of 
heritage,” saying it should be up to South Carolinians whether to 
display it on their statehouse grounds.3  He later apologized, admitting 
that he had compromised his principles in an effort to win the state’s 
primary.4  In 2008, after Barack Obama defeated Hillary Clinton in 
 
* Professor of Touro College & University System.  The author would like to thank Elaine M. 
Reich, Esq. for her invaluable editorial assistance. 
1 Ross Zucker, What Type of Political System is the US?, 9 J. OF POL. POWER 5, 8 (2016). 
2 Ann Banks, Dirty Tricks, South Carolina and John McCain, THE NATION (Jan. 14, 2008), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/dirty-tricks-south-carolina-and-john-mccain/. 
3 Steven A. Holmes, After Campaigning on Candor, McCain Admits He Lacked it on 
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South Carolina, Bill Clinton intimated that Obama only won because 
of race: “Jesse Jackson won South Carolina in ‘84 and ‘88.”5  Several 
weeks later, Geraldine Ferraro, who backed Mrs. Clinton’s candidacy, 
alluded to the same effect: “[i]f Obama was a white man, he would not 
be in this position[,]” she told a reporter.6  “He happens to be very 
lucky to be who he is.  And the country is caught up in the concept.”7  
In 2016, without a massive African-American vote in her favor, Hillary 
Clinton likely would have lost the Democratic primary to Bernie 
Sanders.  Mrs. Clinton won large majorities over Sanders in every state 
with a large population of African-Americans.  For example, on 
June 14, 2016, Mrs. Clinton won 79% of the vote in Washington, D.C., 
which has the largest African-American voter concentration in the 
United States.8  In the recent Alabama U.S. Senate contest, a 95% 
African-American vote for the Democratic candidate propelled him to 
a narrow victory. 
From the founding of our republic to the present, race has been 
at the center of our body politic, and what to do about it has been an 
American political and legal conundrum.  Examples of the centrality 
of race in American politics can be found in many areas such as slave 
owner founding fathers (Washington, Jefferson, etc.), the Three-Fifths 
Compromise, the Civil War, Reconstruction, segregation, Jim Crow, 
Plessy v. Ferguson, and The Dred Scott decision, all of which played 
a central and dismal role in the drama of racial representation in the 
United States.  Recent events in Charlottesville and Virginia, and 
President Trump’s remarks with respect to same, have set off a racial 
firestorm throughout the country.  Sports (“Taking the Knee”), 
patriotism and the President have become a national race issue. 
 
5 Melissa Clyne, Hillary Asks South Carolina Blacks for a Second Chance, NEWSMAX (May 
28, 2015, 12:21 PM), www.newsmax.com/politics/hillary-clinton-south-carolina-blacks-
vote/2015/05/28/id/647247/. 
6 Katharine Q. Seelye & Julie Bosman, Ferraro’s Obama Remarks Become Talk of 
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/us/politics/ 
12campaign.html. 
7 Id. 
8 Yamiche Alcindor & Patrick Healy, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders Meet as Their 
Battle Ends, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/us/politics/ 
bernie-sanders-campaign.html.  The New York Times article on July 13, 2016 reported that 
polls indicate that whites feel aggrieved by African-Americans and that race relations in the 
United States are bleak.  See Giovanni Russonello, Race Relations Are at Lowest Point in 
Obama Presidency, Poll Finds, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/us/most-americans-
hold-grim-view-of-race-relations-poll-finds.html. 
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The empowerment of African-Americans and other minorities 
in the American electoral arena traces directly to the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 (hereinafter “VRA”).9  With the passage in 1965 of the VRA, 
race entered election fora with gladiatorial force.  This article explores 
how starting in 1965, the VRA produced an apex of electoral success 
for African-Americans (and ultimately language minorities) only to 
recede a half century later with the unintended consequences of 
possibly helping to elect as President of the United States, Donald 
Trump, a man very much not a candidate of choice of the minority 
community. 
Part I reviews the various statutes making up the VRA, as well 
as the legislative history that informed its mission.  Part II probes the 
negative political consequences of majority-minority VRA districts, 
namely lower voter turnout, how the VRA helped the Republican Party 
to take control of the House of Representatives, and specifically, its 
influence on the election of Donald Trump as President.  Part III 
analyzes the various Supreme Court decisions involving the VRA and 
demonstrates the Supreme Court’s steady erosion of the 
constitutionality and/or the validity of the VRA.  Part IV suggests 
remedies designed to correct collateral and undesired political fallout 
resulting from an overconcentration of minorities in majority-minority 
congressional districts.  The conclusion will summarize the points 
articulated in this article and suggest future redistricting steps to be 
taken. 
I.   THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
The original VRA was designed to address existing barriers to 
fulfillment of African-American participation in the electoral process.  
It contained two primary sections, § 2 and § 5. 
Section 2 of the Act10 follows the language of the Fifteenth 
Amendment11 forbidding discrimination in the voting franchise on 
 
9 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965) (originally enacted as Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-110, 79 Stat. 437) (current version, as amended, at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2016)). 
10 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2 (stating “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, 
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account 
of race or color.”). 
11 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment states: “The right of citizens of the United States 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
color or previous condition or servitude.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
3
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account of race or color.  In City of Mobile v. Bolden,12 the Supreme 
Court held that to prevail in a § 2 action, the plaintiff must prove that 
the discrimination was purposeful and that the state authorities 
intended such discrimination.13  In response to the Mobile case, 
Congress in 1982 amended § 2 to explicitly proscribe any voting 
practice that had a discriminatory effect irrespective of whether the 
voting discrimination was purposefully intended.14 
However, during congressional debates on the 1982 
Amendments, a racial concern immediately manifested itself on 
account of the proposed results test.15  Many legislators, particularly 
those from the South, were deeply concerned that the effects test would 
result in a standard of proportional representation by race.16  In other 
words, they were worried that minorities would be entitled to be 
elected to the legislative body in proportion to their share of the 
relevant population, irrespective of whether the actual votes for 
minority candidates warranted such an outcome.17  In the view of these 
Southern legislators, under the results test, any voting law or procedure 
in the country that failed to result in mirroring minority population 
makeup in a particular community would be vulnerable to legal 
challenge under § 2.18 
On April 24, 1982, Senator Robert Dole of Kansas proposed a 
compromise on both § 2 and § 5 that was designed to allay the concern 
of those troubled by the proportional representation issue.19  The new 
 
12 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
13 Id. at 66. 
14 The relevant portion of Section (a) of § 2 relating to Mobile, as amended in 1982, reads 
as follows: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, 
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or  
color . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) (current version as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2016)) (emphasis 
added), amended by Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 
Stat. 131, 134 (1982). 
15 See generally Voting Rights Act: Hearings before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of 




18 As discussed later in this article, this concern of unconstitutionally broad affirmative 
electoral action for minorities proved to be prescient. 
19 See Senate Hearings, supra note 15. 
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language of § 2 proposed to retain the results language but to append a 
new subsection (b) as follows which became part of the final bill: 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based 
on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the 
political processes leading to nomination or election in 
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to 
participation by members of a class of citizens 
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. The extent to which 
members of a protected class have been elected to 
office in the State or political subdivision is one 
circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That 
nothing in this section establishes a right to have 
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal 
to their proportion in the population.20 
This compromise, however, contains within itself an inherent tension 
because § 2 has a built-in preference and is remedial while lack of 
proportionality speaks a different and opposing theme. 
Section 2 claims are vote dilution claims that focus on voting 
systems, practices and procedures that dilute the ability of minorities 
to elect candidates of their choice.  They usually arise when whites and 
minorities “consistently prefer different candidates . . . when voting is 
‘racially polarized.’”21  Minority votes can be diluted in two ways: 
spreading the minority group among many districts so they are never a 
majority in any one district (fracturing, which is also known as 
cracking) or over-concentrating minority voters into one or two 
districts thereby reducing minority electoral power in other districts 
(packing).22  Accordingly, obstacles that interfere with the ability of 
members of minority racial and language groups to have a fair 
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice lie at the heart of the § 2 
 
20 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2016)) (emphasis 
added), amended by Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 § 3.  See Senate Hearings, supra 
note 15.  For an extensive review of the legislative history of the § 2 Amendments to the 
Voting Rights Act, refer to Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments 
to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1983). 
21 Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
1663, 1671-72 (2001). 
22 Id. at 1672. 
5
Chill: African-American Electorate
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
718 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
vote dilution claim.  The most blatant example of vote dilution occurs 
as a result of white polarized voting that usually results in deflating 
efforts of minorities to elect candidates of their choice (assumed to be 
fellow minorities) and would “dilute” the minority vote and thus effect 
minority vote dilution.23 
Section 5 of the VRA prohibits certain defined jurisdictions 
called “covered counties” (mostly in the South), subject to its 
provisions (the “Coverage Formula”), from implementing changes in 
a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” without 
federal authorization (“Preclearance”).24  The jurisdiction must either 
(1) obtain a judgment from the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia declaring that the proposed change “does not 
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race or color,” or (2) secure prior 
approval from the U.S. Attorney General.25  Under a 2006 amendment 
to § 5 of the VRA, all covered jurisdictions were compelled to avoid 
drawing new districts that would “diminish[] the number of districts in 
which minority groups [could] ‘elect their preferred candidates of 
choice.’”26  In other words, there could be no retrogression in the 
abilities of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice (called 
“ability to elect districts”).27 
In light of the need to comply with the VRA—which requires 
states to give all of their citizens an equal opportunity to participate in 
the process and to elect representatives of their choice—legislators, the 
Justice Department and the courts compelled legislatures to create 
 
23 Id. 
24 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5. 
25 Id.  In 1970, Congress reauthorized the Act for another five years and extended the 
Coverage Formula in § 4(b) to jurisdictions that had a voting test and less than 50 percent voter 
registration or turnout as of 1968.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970) (originally enacted as Voting 
Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314) (current version as amended at 52 U.S.C. 
§ 10301 (2016)).  In 1975, Congress reauthorized the Act for seven more years and extended 
the same coverage formula to voting conditions as of 1972.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970) 
(originally enacted as Voting Rights Act of 1965, amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 
402) (current version as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2016)).  Congress also extended the 
Voting Rights Act to forbid discrimination based on membership in a language minority 
group.  See id.  In 1982, Congress reauthorized the Act for 25 years.  See Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982 § 2. 
26 Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016) (quoting 52 
U.S.C. § 10304(b)). 
27 Id.  In Shelby County v. Holder, the U.S. Supreme Court held the coverage formula of 
§ 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional rendering § 5 unenforceable.  570 U.S. 529, 
557 (2013).  See a more comprehensive discussion of Shelby County infra Part III. 
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majority-minority districts in which a majority of the voters and 
residents of the district are racial minorities (African-American) or 
language minorities (Hispanic).28  These majority-minority districts 
were created for the specific purpose of increasing minority legislative 
representation. 
In the 1970s, polarized anti-minority voting by whites, 
combined with lower registration and turnout among minorities, 
resulted in the perceived need to create not only majority-minority 
districts, but even super majority-minority districts drawn to contain at 
least 65% minority population.29  Packing African-American voters 
into concentrated electoral vote ghettos, ostensibly to assure election 
of African-Americans, may have had the unintended consequence of 
helping to elect a candidate for President who surely was not the choice 
of African-Americans. 
II. NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF MAJORITY-MINORITY VRA 
DISTRICTS 
Majority-minority districts, however laudatory, resulted in two 
collateral negatives.  First, they resulted, ipso facto, in lower voter 
turnout in those districts.  Second, because the minority vote in those 
districts was overwhelmingly Democratic, the Democratic vote was 
concomitantly lower. 
In this respect, recent Census Bureau data confirm that the 
African-American “voter turnout took a decided downturn in last 
November’s [2016] election—helping to compound the impact of the 
lower than 2012 vote margins that Democrat Hillary Clinton received 
in her loss to Donald Trump.”30 
 
28 The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially Polarized 
Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208, 2208 (2003).  In Bush v. Vera, the Court observed that the 
Texas legislature drew several majority-minority districts “with a view to complying with the 
Voting Rights Act.”  517 U.S. 952, 957 (1996). 
29 Future of Majority-Minority Districts, supra note 28, at 2216.  The 65% number was 
chosen by allocating 5% over 50% for lesser voting population (predominantly underage 
individuals), 5% for lower voter registration, plus 5% because of lower turnout.  See Future 
of Majority-Minority Districts, supra note 28, at 2216 n.48 (citing DEWEY M. CLAYTON, 
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 75 (2000)). 
30 William H. Frey, Census Shows Pervasive Decline in 2016 Minority Voter Turnout, 
BROOKINGS: THE AVENUE (May 18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/theavenue/ 
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With Barack Obama on the ballot in 2012, the African-
American voter turnout rate (66%) surpassed that of whites for the first 
time.  As a May 18, 2017 Brookings Institute Report noted, the strong 
African-American voter turnout for Obama was probably “attributable 
to an extraordinary surge in enthusiasm for the first African-American 
major party nominee . . . .”31  With Hillary Clinton on the ballot in 
2016, the number of African-American voters declined by 
approximately 765,000, falling seven percentage points to 59.6%.32  
While this finding was politically irrelevant in blue states where 
Clinton won the popular vote overwhelmingly, and correspondingly 
the electoral vote, it made a significant difference in three swing 
states—Michigan Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. 
It is an axiom of the voting world that the more competitive the 
electoral environment, the greater voter turnout.  A competitive 
election results in greater campaign resources, such as money, get-out-
the-vote efforts, local campaign funded offices, greater media attention 
and intense advertising efforts.  The linkage between electoral 
competitiveness and voter turnout is thus clear.33 
Michigan 
Michigan’s 13th (formerly 14th) Congressional District is a 
paradigmatic example of a majority-minority district where the 
absence of any competitive congressional race in 2016 appears to have 
contributed to a lower voter turnout than in 2012.  Michigan’s 13th 
Congressional District for more than 53 years has been represented by 
Representative John Conyers, an African-American Democratic 
congressman.34  Congressman Conyers’ margin of victory against 
 
31 Id. 
32 Jens Manuel Krogstat & Mark Hugo Lopez, Black Voter Turnout Fell in 2016, Even as 
Record Number of Americans Cast Ballots, PEW RES. CTR. (May 12, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/12/black-voter-turnout-fell-in-2016-even-as-
a-record-number-of-americans-cast-ballots/. 
33 Alexander Agadjanian, A Correlation Between State Competitiveness and Voter 
Turnout?, DECISION DESK HQ (Dec. 19, 2016, 6:06 PM), https://decisiondeskhq.com/data-
dives/a-correlation-between-state-competitiveness-and-voter-turnout-guest-post-by-
alexander-agadjanian/.  See generally MARK N. FRANKLIN, VOTER TURNOUT AND THE 
DYNAMICS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES SINCE 1945 (2004). 
34 John Conyers Jr., BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/John_Conyers_Jr. (last visited 
June 3, 2018).  On December 5, 2017, Congressman Conyers resigned from the House of 
Representatives as a result of a sexual scandal.  Id. 
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Republican challengers has been overwhelming, with Conyers 
receiving 77.1% to 92.9% of the vote.35 
In 2016, a total of only 265,343 people voted for President in 
Michigan’s 13th Congressional District.36  That was 27,821 fewer 
voters than the 293,164 people who voted for President there in 2012.37  
President Trump’s margin of victory in Michigan was only 
approximately 10,000 votes.38   Had the voter turnout in Michigan’s 
13th Congressional District in 2016 been equal to the voter turnout in 
2012, Clinton would have received approximately 21,925 additional 
votes (78.81% of 27,821) compared to only approximately 5,044 
additional votes for Trump (18.13% of 27,821).39  Consequently, the 
margin of victory might have swung in Clinton’s favor with her 
winning the popular vote by 4,517 votes and, with that, Michigan’s 16 
electoral votes.  Pellucidly, since there was no competitive 
congressional race in the 13th Congressional District, the low turnout 
in that majority-minority district was a contributing factor in Clinton 
losing Michigan’s 16 electoral votes. 
Wisconsin 
While Wisconsin’s 4th Congressional District is not a majority-
minority district, it is 33.6% African-American40 and is represented by 
a long-term African-American incumbent, Gwen Moore, who has won 
with a large percentage of the vote.41  While not a classic majority-
minority district, its voting patterns closely mirror those of traditional 
Voting Rights Act districts. 
 
35 Id. 
36 See Daily Kos Elections’ Statewide Election Results by Congressional and Legislative 
Districts, DAILY KOS (July 9, 2013, 2:52 PM), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2013/07/09/ 
1220127/-Daily-Kos-Elections-2012-election-results-by-congressional-and-legislative-
districts. 
37 See id.   
38 Id.  See also Michigan Presidential Race Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 1, 2017, 11:25 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/michigan-president-
clinton-trump. 
39 See Daily Kos Elections’, supra note 36. 
40 See My Congressional District, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/mycd/ 
(last visited June 3, 2018). 
41 Congresswoman Moore was elected by her colleagues to serve in the leadership of the 
Congressional Black Caucus as Caucus Whip. Biography, CONGRESSWOMAN GWEN MOORE, 
https://gwenmoore.house.gov/biography/ (last visited June 3, 2018). 
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In 2016, a total of only 308,575 people voted for President in 
Wisconsin’s 4th Congressional District, 47,780 fewer than the 356,355 
people who voted for President there in 2012.42  Trump’s margin of 
victory in Wisconsin was approximately 23,000.43  Had the voter 
turnout in Wisconsin’s 4th Congressional District in 2016 been equal 
to the voter turnout in 2012, Clinton would have received 
approximately 35,338 additional votes (73.96% of 47,780) compared 
to only approximately 10,421 additional votes for Trump (21.81% of 
47,780).44  Consequently, the margin of victory might have swung in 
Clinton’s favor with her winning the popular vote by 2,169 votes and, 
with that, Wisconsin’s 10 electoral votes.  As in Michigan, the 
diminished turnout in Wisconsin’s 4th Congressional District resulted 
at least in part, from the lack of a competitive congressional race. 
Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania was a third swing state carried by Trump by a 
margin of less than 1% of the vote (approximately 45,000).45  Very 
likely his margin of victory in Pennsylvania would have been more 
robust but for an aberrant political occurrence in one of its Democratic 
stronghold majority-minority districts. 
The 2nd Congressional District located in Philadelphia was a 
majority-minority district whose African-American Democratic 
congressmen traditionally won the general election by more than 90% 
of the vote.  The turnout in the 2nd Congressional District in the 2016 
election was almost as great as in the 2012 election.46  While this might 
seem counterintuitive, there was an anomalous political occurrence in 
this particular district. 
From 1994 until 2016, Chaka Fattah was the long term 
Democratic African-American Congressman from the 2nd 
Pennsylvania Congressional District winning the general elections 
almost always with nearly 90% of the vote.47  On June 23, 2016, Fattah 
resigned from the House of Representatives following a racketeering 
 
42 See Daily Kos Elections’, supra note 36. 
43 See Daily Kos Elections’, supra note 36. 
44 See Daily Kos Elections’, supra note 36. 
45 See Daily Kos Elections’, supra note 36. 
46 See Daily Kos Elections’, supra note 36. 
47 See Pennsylvania’s 2nd Congressional District Elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania%27s_2nd_Congressional_District (last visited June 3, 
2018). 
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conviction.48  Notwithstanding his conviction, Fattah ran for re-
election but was defeated in a hotly contested Democratic primary by 
Dwight Evans who then won the general election by 90.3% of the 
vote.49  A special election to fill out the remainder of Fattah’s term, 
which was also won by Evans, was also held on the same day as the 
general election.50 
Plainly, all of the election activity (3 elections) revolving about 
the Fattah-Evans contests was a significant factor in contributing to the 
greater general election turnout in 2016.  Because of this unusual 
election activity happening in Pennsylvania’s 2nd Congressional 
District, we cannot draw conclusions either way as to its impact on the 
turnout in 2016.  Also, Trump’s margin of victory of 45,000 votes may 
have been too large to overcome even with an increased voter turnout 
in the 2nd Congressional District. 
Admittedly, while the lower 2016 voter turnout in the 
Wisconsin and Michigan majority-minority districts was probably not 
entirely attributable to lack of congressional competitiveness in the 
African-American congressional districts, lack of competition in those 
African-American congressional races was at least a significant 
contributing factor in the lower voter turnout. 
Concededly, had Clinton won only the Wisconsin and 
Michigan electoral votes and not Pennsylvania, she would have 
diminished Trump’s total by only 26 (16+10).  Nevertheless, adding 
26 electoral votes to Clinton’s electoral vote total of 232 and 
subtracting 26 electoral votes from Trump’s 306 electoral vote total 
would have left Trump with an electoral vote margin of only 22 
electoral votes,51 giving Trump an Electoral College margin even 
lower than that of Rutherford B. Hayes.52 
While even with a 22 vote electoral margin, Trump still would 
have won, a narrower electoral margin would have given even more 
 
48 MaryClaire Dale, US Rep. Fattah Steps Down After Racketeering Conviction, WASH. 
TIMES (June 23, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/23/us-rep-fattah-
steps-down-after-racketeering-convic/. 
49 See Pennsylvania’s 2nd Congressional District Elections, supra note 47. 
50 See Pennsylvania’s 2nd Congressional District Elections, supra note 47. 
51 Kierston Schmidt & Wilson Andrews, A Historic Number of Electors Defected, and Most 
Were Supposed to Vote for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2016/12/19/us/elections/electoral-college-results.html. 
52 Initially, Hayes actually lost the electoral vote to Tilden 184 to 165.  LLOYD ROBINSON, 
THE STOLEN ELECTION: HAYES VERSUS TILDEN-1876, 123-89 (2001).  Twenty ballots were 
disputed but ultimately were awarded to Hayes as a result of a political compromise.  Id.  This 
gave Hayes the requisite electoral vote majority of 1 vote.  Id. 
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impetus to those attempts to politically delegitimize the Trump 
presidency especially in light of Clinton’s overwhelming popular vote 
margin of victory.53 
Yet another factor in suppressing voter turnout is the 
incumbency advantage.54  Incumbency protection is pervasive, 
especially in majority-minority districts.  Once the district is racially 
gerrymandered and a minority congressperson installed, it is almost 
impossible to defeat them other than in a primary (and that only rarely).  
The majority-minority district holders are uniformly Democrats 
unchallenged in a competitive election, let alone in a primary.  For 
example, Charles Rangel, an African-American congressman from 
Harlem, served in Congress for 46 years.55  He was the second longest 
serving incumbent member of the House of Representatives becoming 
the first African-American Chairman of the House Ways & Means 
Committee, as well as Dean of New York’s Congressional 
Delegation.56  From 1972 onward, Rangel won re-election with over 
88% of the vote, and often with over 95%, and sometimes no 
Republican even ran against him.57 
Congressman Jose Serrano is a Hispanic congressman from the 
South Bronx who has served as a congressman for over 27 years.58  In 
the last 15 years, he has not won an election with less than 63.9% of 
the vote.59 
 
53 In fact, had the unusual and aberrational election activity in Pennsylvania’s 2nd 
Congressional District in 2016 not skewed the normally low voter turnout upward, it is 
theoretically possible (though admittedly speculative) that Trump might have lost 
Pennsylvania’s 20 electoral votes (and the presidency itself). 
54 See Congressional Elections, LUMEN: BOUNDLESS POL. SCI., 
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-politicalscience/chapter/congressional-
elections/ (last visited June 3, 2018). 
55 Charles Rangel, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://history.house.gov/People/Listing/R/RANGEL,-Charles-B--(R000053) (last visited June 
3, 2018).  Congressman Rangel did not run for re-election in 2016 and was replaced by a 
Hispanic individual, Adriano Espaillat, who won the general election overwhelmingly.  See 
Charles Rangel, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Charles_Rangel (last visited June 3, 
2018). 
56 Charles Rangel, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, supra note 55. 
57 MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1169 
(2008). 
58 See Jose Serrano, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Jose_Serrano (last visited June 
3, 2018). 
59 See id. 
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James Clyburn, an African-American, has represented South 
Carolina’s 6th Congressional District for over 25 years.60  In 25 years, 
he has won with between 62.9% and 93.6% of the vote.61 
As in other super packed majority-minority districts, John 
Conyers, discussed above,62 has won with between 77% and 90% of 
the vote with ever increasing margins, sometimes with no opponent 
whatsoever.63 
Incumbency driven lower minority turnout inevitably means a 
lesser overall Democratic vote. 
III. RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS MAY DIMINISH 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS IN 
FUTURE ELECTIONS 
A. Evolution of Case Law in the Supreme Court 
In United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. 
Carey,64 in order to obtain preclearance from the Justice Department 
pursuant to § 5 of the VRA for Assembly and Senate districts in Kings 
County (a covered county), the legislature was required to enact a 
redistricting plan that deliberately split an all-white Hasidic Jewish 
community previously located within a single Senate and Assembly 
district into two separate Senate and Assembly districts.65  This was 
considered necessary to create a super majority-minority district of 
65% minority population.66  The Hasidic community sued alleging that 
the splitting of this community “‘would dilute the value of each 
plaintiff’s franchise by halving its effectiveness,’ solely for the purpose 
of achieving a racial quota . . . in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”67 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this super 
majority-minority district notwithstanding the flat out concession that 
“[t]here is no doubt that in preparing the 1974 legislation the State 
 
60 See James Clyburn, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/James_Clyburn (last visited 
June 3, 2018). 
61 See id. 
62 See discussion of John Conyers supra Part II, Michigan. 
63 See John Conyers Jr., supra note 34. 
64 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
65 Id. at 152. 
66 Id. at 164-65. 
67 Id. at 152-53. 
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deliberately used race in a purposeful manner.”68  Presaging the 
Supreme Court’s later discomfort with race-based majority-minority 
districting, Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented as follows: 
The use of a mathematical formula tends to sustain the 
existence of ghettos by promoting the notion that 
political clout is to be gained or maintained by 
marshaling particular racial, ethnic, or religious groups 
in enclaves. It suggests to the voter that only a candidate 
of the same race, religion, or ethnic origin can properly 
represent that voter’s interests, and that such candidate 
can be elected only from a district with a sufficient 
minority concentration. The device employed by the 
State of New York, and endorsed by the Court today, 
moves us one step farther away from a truly 
homogeneous society.69 
In 1986, in Thornburg v. Gingles,70 the Supreme Court drilled 
down on the ingredients of a § 2 vote dilution claim.71  The Court held 
that plaintiffs asserting a vote dilution claim under the amended § 2 
must at least prove that (1) the state could have drawn an additional, 
compact majority-minority district (the Gingles district) but failed to 
do so; (2) the minority group is politically “cohesive”—that is, its 
members vote in a similar fashion; and (3) the white electorate votes 
as a bloc, thus enabling whites usually to defeat the minority group’s 
preferred candidates at the polls.72  Professor Samuel Issacharoff 
 
68 Id. at 165. 
69 United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 186-87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  See also 
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1030 (1994). 
70 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
71 See generally id. 
72 Id. at 50-51 (emphasis added).  If all three Gingles requirements are established, the 
statute requires a further analysis of the “totality of circumstances” to determine whether 
members of a racial group have less opportunity than do other members of the electorate.  Id. 
at 43.  The totality of the circumstances analysis was derived from the Supreme Court’s 
analytical framework in White and first articulated by the Court in Zimmer v. McKeithen.  485 
F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 
U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added).  Those factors were adopted by the Senate 
Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.  S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 
28-29 (1982).  The Supreme Court has invoked the Senate Report on the 1982 amendments to 
the Voting Rights Act, which identifies factors typically relevant to a § 2 claim, including: 
the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political 
subdivision; the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or 
political subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which the State or 
political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to 
14
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noted that “Gingles brought the racially polarized voting inquiry into 
the undisputed and unchallenged center of the [VRA] . . . .”73  As will 
be demonstrated, the corollary is when there is no polarized white 
voting, majority-minority districts are unnecessary and often 
unconstitutional as racial gerrymanders failing strict scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
By the early 1990s, the Supreme Court changed direction on 
the issue of race-based districting.  Shaw v. Reno74 involved a 
challenge to the constitutionality of a bizarrely shaped, newly created, 
African-American congressional district in North Carolina (District 
12).75  North Carolina was a state covered by the requirements of § 5 
of the VRA.76  The district contained a majority-minority population 
drawn to meet the objections of the United States Attorney General to 
an earlier version of District 12; the revised District 12 that was at issue 
was precleared by the Attorney General.77  A lawsuit claiming that 
District 12 was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander reached the 
Supreme Court.78  In recognizing a constitutional claim forbidding 
racial gerrymandering, the Court, in a 5-4 decision echoing Justice 
Burger’s dissent in United Jewish Organizations, stated: 
 
enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group . . . 
the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past 
discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which 
hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; the 
use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent 
to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office 
in the jurisdiction. The Report notes also that evidence demonstrating that 
elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the 
members of the minority group and that the policy underlying the State’s 
or the political subdivision’s use of the contested practice or structure is 
tenuous may have probative value. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29, 36-37) (internal citations 
omitted).  See also League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 426 
(2006) [hereinafter “LULAC”].  Gingles was a multi-member district case.  See generally 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 30.  In Growe v. Emison, the Supreme Court applied the Gingles analysis 
and holding to single member districts as well.  507 U.S. 25 (1993).  See also De Grandy, 512 
U.S. at 1015. 
73 Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of 
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1851 (1992). 
74 509 U.S. 630 (1993) [hereinafter “Reno”]. 
75 Id. at 655-56. 
76 Id. at 634. 
77 Id. 
78 See generally id. at 630. 
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A reapportionment plan that includes in one district 
individuals who belong to the same race, but who are 
otherwise widely separated by geographical and 
political boundaries, and who may have little in 
common with one another but the color of their skin, 
bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political 
apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of 
the same racial group—regardless of their age, 
education, economic status, or the community in which 
the live—think alike, share the same political interests, 
and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We 
have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as 
impermissible racial stereotypes. By perpetuating such 
notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very 
patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority 
districting is sometimes said to counteract. 
 
The message that such districting sends to elected 
representatives is equally pernicious. When a district 
obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived 
common interests of one racial group, elected officials 
are more likely to believe that their primary obligation 
is to represent only the members of that group, rather 
than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether 
antithetical to our system of representative 
democracy.79 
 
*     *     * 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff 
challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal 
Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the 
legislation, though race neutral on its face, rationally 
cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 
separate voters into different districts on the basis of 
 
79 Reno, 509 U.S. at 647-48 (internal citations omitted). 
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race, and that the separation lacks sufficient 
justification.80 
While recognizing for the first time a constitutional claim of 
racial gerrymandering, the Court remanded the case to the District 
Court without deciding whether the challenged district in that case, on 
its face, constituted an impermissible racial gerrymander.81  Although 
it did not decide the merits of the claimed racial gerrymander, in 
remanding the case, the Supreme Court instructed that: 
If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains 
uncontradicted, the District Court further must 
determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling governmental 
interest.82 
In Miller v. Johnson,83 the Supreme Court, in another 5-4 
decision (authored by Justice Kennedy), found a Georgia 
congressional redistricting plan unconstitutional as violative of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.84  The plan 
contained three majority African-American districts adopted after the 
Justice Department refused to preclear an earlier plan that contained 
only two African-American majority districts.85  In clarifying racial 
gerrymandering claims post Reno, the Court stated: 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides that no State shall “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” Its central mandate is racial neutrality in 
governmental decisionmaking. Though application of 
this imperative raises difficult questions, the basic 
principle is straightforward: “Racial and ethnic 
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus 
call for the most exacting judicial examination. . . .  This 
perception of racial and ethnic distinctions is rooted in 
our Nation’s constitutional and demographic history.” 
This rule obtains with equal force regardless of “the 
 
80 Id. at 649. 
81 Id. at 656. 
82 Id. at 658 (emphasis added). 
83 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
84 Id. at 924. 
85 Id. at 907-09. 
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race of those burdened or benefited by a particular 
classification.” Laws classifying citizens on the basis of 
race cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored 
to achieving a compelling state interest.86 
When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it 
engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption 
that voters of a particular race, because of their race, 
“think alike, share the same political interests, and will 
prefer the same candidates at the polls.”87 
First, although acknowledging that the legislature must always 
be aware of race when redistricting, the Court found evidence of intent 
to racially gerrymander overwhelming and all but stipulated to by the 
parties.88  As such, under the Reno precedent, the district was subject 
to strict scrutiny.89 
In finding the plan unconstitutional, the Court observed that 
there was little doubt that the state’s true interest in designing the plan 
was to add an extra, third African-American majority district.90  The 
Court further found: 
The Justice Department refused to preclear both of 
Georgia’s first two submitted redistricting plans. The 
District Court found that the Justice Department had 
adopted a “black-maximization” policy under § 5, and 
that it was clear from its objection letters that the 
Department would not grant preclearance until the State 
made the “Macon/Savannah trade” and created a third 
majority-black district. It is, therefore, safe to say that 
the congressional plan enacted in the end was required 
in order to obtain preclearance. It does not follow, 
however, that the plan was required by the substantive 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act. 
 
 
86 Id. at 904 (internal citations omitted). 
87 Id. at 911-12 (citing Reno, 509 U.S. at 647). 
88 Miller, 515 U.S. at 910. 
89 Id. at 913.  Rejecting the decision in United Jewish Organizations, the Court in Miller 
held “[t]o the extent any of the opinions in that ‘highly fractured decision,’ can be interpreted 
as suggesting that a State’s assignment of voters on the basis of race would be subject to 
anything but our strictest scrutiny, those views ought not be deemed controlling.”  Id. at 915 
(internal citations omitted). 
90 Id. at 921. 
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We do not accept the contention that the State has a 
compelling interest in complying with whatever 
preclearance mandates the Justice Department issues.91 
 
*     *     * 
 
Instead of grounding its objections on evidence of a 
discriminatory purpose, it would appear the 
Government was driven by its policy of maximizing 
majority-black districts.92 
In 1996, in Shaw v. Hunt,93 the North Carolina congressional 
redistricting plan (District 12) returned to the Supreme Court after the 
remand to the District Court.94  The District Court held that the plan 
was racially motivated but survived strict scrutiny.95  The Supreme 
Court reversed holding the districting plan unconstitutional.96  North 
Carolina had deliberately drawn a bizarrely shaped majority-minority 
district in the center of the state (District 12).97  In defending against 
the plaintiff’s racial gerrymander claim, the state argued that it had 
drawn District 12 to achieve a compelling state interest in compliance 
with § 2 [of the VRA].98  The Court assumed, arguendo, that 
compliance with § 2 constitutes a compelling state interest justifying 
the creation of a majority-minority district. 99 
The Court held that a remedy for vote dilution is not narrowly 
tailored to comply with § 2 if the remedial district drawn by the state 
substantially departs from a compact Gingles district.100  The Court 
stated, a bizarrely shaped district “somewhere else in the State” does 
not remedy “the vote-dilution injuries suffered by” minority voters 
residing within the Gingles district.101  The Court held that creating an 
 
91 Id. at 921-22. 
92 Miller, 515 U.S. at 924. 
93 517 U.S. 899 (1996) [hereinafter “Hunt”]. 
94 See generally id. 
95 Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev’d, 517 U.S. 899 (1996). 
96 See generally Hunt, 517 U.S. at 899. 
97 Id. at 903. 
98 Id. at 911. 
99 Id. at 915. 
100 Id. at 916-17. 
101 Hunt, 517 U.S. at 917. 
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additional majority African-American district in North Carolina was 
not required under a correct reading of § 5 or § 2 and that District 12, 
as drawn, was not a remedy narrowly tailored to the State’s professed 
interest in avoiding Voting Rights Act liability.102 
Having previously determined in Reno, Miller and Hunt that 
the VRA does not justify use of predominate racial gerrymandering as 
an excuse to maximize majority-minority districts, the Supreme Court 
in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama103 questioned the 
very need to create majority-minority districts altogether.104  Thus, 
while maximization was prohibited (Miller), even minimal numbers of 
majority-minority districts became constitutionally suspect.105 
In 2012, the State of Alabama redrew its House and Senate 
districts.106  In reversing the District Court,107 the Supreme Court found 
that the District Court made four erroneous critical determinations in 
finding the challenged, racially driven, districts constitutional.108  First, 
contrary to the District Court, a claim for racial gerrymandering is a 
claim addressed to specific electoral districts, not statewide districting 
as a whole.109  Second, only certain plaintiffs have standing to bring 
the claim.110  Third, the District Court erred when it did not find that 
race was shown to be the predominant basis for the districting.111  
Fourth, the districts were not narrowly tailored when the state sought 
to justify unconstitutional predominantly race-based districting as 
necessary to comply with § 5 of the VRA.112 
Seeking to avoid retrogression in violation of § 5 of the VRA 
(as amended in 2006), the state maintained roughly the same African-
American population percentage within the new districts as existed in 
 
102 Id. at 911.  In 2006, in LULAC, Chief Justice Roberts, in an opinion joined by Justice 
Alito, claimed that majority-minority districting is all a “sordid business, this divvying us up 
by race.”  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
However, the principal holding in LULAC was a finding that Texas District 23 was a violation 
of § 2 of the VRA and that Texas District 25 did not violate § 2 of the VRA.  Id. at 447. 
103 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015). 
104 See generally id. 
105 See generally id. 
106 Id. at 1263. 
107 Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (2013), rev’d, 135 S. 
Ct. 1257 (2015). 
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the earlier 2001 Alabama districting plan.113  The Supreme Court held 
that this compliance with § 5 did not survive strict scrutiny because it 
was not narrowly tailored to comply with § 5.114  It stated: 
Section 5, which covered particular States and certain 
other jurisdictions, does not require a covered 
jurisdiction to maintain a particular numerical minority 
percentage. It requires the jurisdiction to maintain a 
minority’s ability to elect a preferred candidate of 
choice.115 
Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections116 was a 2017 
challenge to the State of Virginia’s redrawn state legislative districts.117  
In order to comply with the non-retrogression requirements of § 5 of 
the VRA, the lines at issue in 12 of the districts were drawn with a goal 
of ensuring that each district would have an African-American voting 
age population (BVAP) of at least 55%, and in some cases, more.118 
The Court reviewed its holdings in Reno, Hunt, Miller 
(impermissible racial predominance) and Alabama Legislative (narrow 
tailoring analysis) with respect to 11 of the 12 districts.119  It reversed 
the District Court and remanded.120  The Supreme Court held “a 
conflict or inconsistency between the enacted plan and traditional 
redistricting criteria is not a threshold requirement or a mandatory 
precondition in order for a challenger to establish a claim of racial 
gerrymandering,”121 as the District Court erroneously had found.  With 
respect to the remaining district (75), the Supreme Court upheld the 
District Court’s finding that although District 75 was racially based, it 
was on the specific and unique facts of the case, narrowly tailored to 
avoid violating § 5 of the VRA.122 
In May of 2017, the Supreme Court came out the other way.123  
In that year, North Carolina’s congressional districting returned once 
 
113 Alabama Legislative, 135 S. Ct. at 1286. 
114 Id. at 1272. 
115 Id. 
116 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017). 
117 See generally id. 
118 Id. at 794. 
119 See generally id. 
120 Id. at 802. 
121 Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 799. 
122 Id. at 802. 
123 Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017). 
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again to the Supreme Court.124  After the 2010 census, North Carolina 
created two majority-minority districts (District 1 and District 12).125  
The legislature increased the BVAP in District 1 from 48.6% to 52.7% 
and in District 12 from 43.8% to 50.7%.126  The District Court found 
that because race predominated in the enactment of both districts, the 
districts became subject to strict scrutiny, which neither district 
survived.127 
With respect to District 1, the state argued that it was narrowly 
tailored to avoid a § 2 vote dilution claim.128  The Supreme Court 
affirmed the District Court’s holding that compliance with § 2 of the 
VRA was legally impossible in that case because the third Gingles 
prerequisite to a § 2 claim (polarized white racial voting) could not be 
demonstrated.129  Therefore, compliance with § 2 was unavailing to 
justify the racial motivation informing the construction of the 
district.130  Since there was no possibility of a § 2 violation, there was 
no justification for a predominantly race based district as necessary to 
avoid § 2 liability.131 
With respect to District 12, the Supreme Court found evidence 
that racial considerations also predominated in designing District 12.132  
Since North Carolina did not even attempt to justify District 12’s racial 
classification, the district was clearly constitutionally infirm.133 
Although the Supreme Court never determined the precise 
minority percentage a majority-minority district could contain that 
would pass muster against a § 2 racial gerrymander dilution claim, 
leaving it to a case by case factual analysis, it clearly continued to 
demonstrate its concern with the constitutional problems inherent in 
the creation of majority-minority districts.134  It also continued its view 
 
124 See generally id. 
125 Id. at 1466. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1469. 
129 Id. at 1470. 
130 Id. at 1471. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 1478. 
133 Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1478. 
134 See generally id; see also Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018). 
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that the VRA usually cannot be used as an excuse to construct 
unconstitutional race based majority-minority districts.135 
More importantly, the Supreme Court has recognized the fact 
that there has been a visible slackening of white voter polarization in 
the United States in recent years and African-Americans can elect 
candidates of their choice (presumably other African-Americans, if 
they so choose) without the necessity of packing a district with an 
excess of African-American voters.  This ever changing new voting 
phenomenon is graphically demonstrated in the relatively recent 
Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder.136 
In holding § 4 of the VRA (the Coverage Formula) 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court’s rationale rested on the belief 
that increased African-American voting strength made remedial 
statutes like § 4 of the VRA unnecessary and, therefore, 
unconstitutional.137 
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Chief Justice Roberts wrote: 
“[v]oter turnout and registration rates now approach 
parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal 
decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at 
unprecedented levels.” The tests and devices that 
blocked access to the ballot have been forbidden 
nationwide for over 40 years. . . . 
Those conclusions are not ours alone. Congress said 
the same when it reauthorized the Act in 2006, writing 
that “[s]ignificant progress has been made in 
eliminating first generation barriers experienced by 
minority voters, including increased numbers of 
registered minority voters, minority voter turnout, and 
minority representation in Congress, State legislatures, 
and local elected offices.” The House Report elaborated 
that “the number of African-Americans who are 
registered and who turn out to cast ballots has increased 
 
135 See generally id.  See also Tarini Parti, High Court Reasserts Voting Rights Act in 
Alabama Decision, POLITICO (Mar. 25, 2015, 12:04 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/ 
03/supreme-court-alabama-redistricting-ruling-116384. 
136 See introduction of this 2013 case supra note 27.  The Shelby County case declared the 
Coverage Formula of § 4(b) of the VRA unconstitutional in light of current conditions and 
based on unequal sovereignty treatment of various states in violation of federalism principles.  
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significantly over the last 40 years, particularly since 
1982,” and noted that “[i]n some circumstances, 
minorities register to vote and cast ballots at levels that 
surpass those of white voters.” That Report also 
explained that there have been “significant increases in 
the number of African-Americans serving in elected 
offices”; more specifically, there has been 
approximately a 1,000 percent increase since 1965 in 
the number of African-American elected officials in the 
six States originally covered by the Voting Rights 
Act.138 
Notwithstanding the distaste some Justices have for majority-
minority districts, the Supreme Court has not yet declared § 2 of the 
VRA unconstitutional.139 
However, the declaration in Shelby County that § 4(b) of the 
VRA was unconstitutional rested in part on the fact that white 
polarized voting had diminished and there was “increased numbers of 
registered minority voters, minority voter turnout, and minority 
representation in Congress.”140  That same logic could easily be applied 
to § 2.  In essence, the claim would be that there is no longer a need 
for § 2, or even the VRA altogether, to remedy African-American vote 
dilution since the African-American vote is not being diluted anymore, 
white polarization has eroded, and race-based districting is inherently 
unconstitutional. 
B. Partisanship and Minority-Majority Districting 
Not only does creating safe minority-majority Democratic 
congressional seats negatively impact voter turnout, which in turn, 
could cause a Democratic Party presidential candidate to lose a state’s 
electoral vote, but over concentrating African-Americans into urban 
 
138 Id. at 547 (internal citations omitted). 
139 See, e.g., Bush, 517 U.S. at  992 (“We should allow States to assume the constitutionality 
of § 2 of the VRA, including the 1982 amendments.”); De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1028-29 (1994) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is important to emphasize that the 
precedents to which I refer, like today’s decision, only construe the statute, and do not purport 
to assess its constitutional implications.”); Shelby County, 570 U.S at 556-57 (“That is why, 
in 2009, we took care to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act when 
asked to do so . . . .”).  See generally LUIS FUENTES-ROHWER, THE FUTURE OF SECTION 2 OF 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN THE HANDS OF A CONSERVATIVE COURT (2010). 
140 Shelby County, 570 U.S at 547. 
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss3/3
2018 AFRICAN-AMERICAN ELECTORATE 737 
districts (which is usually where they reside) actually hurts the 
Democratic Party’s ability to win congressional seats.141   
It is an article of political faith that African-Americans vote 
overwhelmingly Democratic,142 which the Supreme Court has 
recognized in a number of cases. 
In 1998, North Carolina enacted yet another congressional 
redistricting plan (again involving District 12).143  The plan was 
challenged as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.144  The District 
Court granted summary judgment finding the 12th District 
unconstitutional on the ground that it was primarily race based.145  The 
Supreme Court reversed finding summary judgment premature and 
remanding to the District Court for a fact based inquiry as to whether 
the District was drawn for political purposes, namely “to make District 
12 a strong democratic District,” or was an  unconstitutional race based 
District.146  In doing so, the Supreme Court stated: 
Our prior decisions have made clear that a jurisdiction 
may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, 
even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats 
happen to be black Democrats and even if the State 
were conscious of that fact.147 
Upon remand, the District Court, after trial, found that race, not 
politics, predominated in the construction of District 12.148  The 
Supreme Court again reversed holding that the evidence showed that 
the motivation of the legislature in enacting the boundaries of District 
12 was to create an overwhelmingly Democratic District (since 
African-American voters vote overwhelmingly for Democratic 
candidates and the district’s boundaries were primarily politically, not 
racially, driven).149 
 
141 See Steven Hill, How the Voting Rights Act Hurts the Democrats and Minorities, THE 
ATLANTIC: POL. (June 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/06/how-
the-voting-rights-act-hurts-democrats-and-minorities/276893/. 
142 Matthew Delmont, When Black Voters Exited Left, THE ATLANTIC: POL. (Mar. 31, 2016),  
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/exit-left/476190/. 
143 See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999). 
144 See generally id. 
145 Id. at 543. 
146 Id. at 549. 
147 Id. at 551 (emphasis added and in original). 
148 Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 552. 
149 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
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In Bush, in finding the districts in question to be 
unconstitutional because their construction was primarily race based, 
the Supreme Court nevertheless recognized that the African-American 
vote is overwhelmingly Democratic stating: “as it happens, . . . many 
of the voters being fought over [by the neighboring Democratic 
incumbents] were African-American.”150 
Accordingly, when the African-American voter turnout is 
diminished, the corresponding Democratic vote is similarly 
diminished. 
Political pundits overwhelmingly have recognized that 
drawing of majority-minority districts not only elected 
more minorities, it also had the effect of bleeding 
minority voters out of all the surrounding districts. 
Given that minority voters were the most reliably 
Democratic voters, that made all of the neighboring 
districts more Republican. The black, Latino, and Asian 
representatives mostly were replacing white 
Democrats, and the increase in minority representation 
was coming at the expense of electing fewer 
Democrats.151 
An article published in Sabato’s Crystal Ball echoes the view 
stating: 
the fact is that many Democrats would prefer to weaken 
majority-minority districts. Part of the Democrats’ 
challenge in winning the House is that the VRA forces 
them to place their most loyal supporters into districts 
with one another. If Democrats could weaken these 
districts, they could dilute Republican strength in the 
suburbs and create more Democratic districts.152 
 
150 Bush, 517 U.S. at 968. 
151 Hill, supra note 141. 
152 Sean Trende, The 2020 Reapportionment and the Voting Rights Act, U. OF VA. CTR. FOR 
POL.: SABATO’S CRYSTAL BALL (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/ 
articles/the-2020-reapportionment-and-the-voting -rights-act/. 
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IV. REMEDIES 
This absence of competitive races against the almost 48 
incumbent African-American congresspeople153 assuredly has been a 
major cause of the low voter turnout in those districts which, in turn, 
contributes to a lower Democratic vote.  Further, not only are there 48 
African-American congresspeople—almost all in super safe majority-
minority districts and almost all Democrats—but there are also 29 
Hispanic representatives (all Democrats) protected by the VRA.  Like 
their fellow African-American congresspeople, these Hispanic 
representatives are elected from majority-minority districts with 75% 
to 90% of the vote, often with no Republican opponents.154  
Accordingly, at minimum, 18% of the entire House of Representatives 
face no real competitive races.  Certainly voter turnout generally, and 
Democratic turnout in particular, has to be negatively affected. 
Once majority-minority districts pass into election history, the 
congressional districts with substantial minority population (albeit not 
necessarily a majority) will become more competitive.  This would 
increase minority turnout which would then result in a larger 
Democratic vote statewide and which, in turn, would cause the 
electoral vote in the swing states to go to the Democratic candidate 
rather than to the Republican. 
Given the history of endemic discrimination against minorities, 
especially with respect to the voting franchise, the VRA was a 
compelling necessity designed to redress the voting grievances of 
disenfranchised minorities.  Majority-minority districts proved to be a 
laudatory and successful mechanism to effect the election of minorities 
to federal, state and local legislative offices.  The number of minorities 
elected to office grew dramatically over the years commencing in 1965 
with the passage of the VRA. 
While its beginnings had salutary effects, over the years those 
majority-minority districts caused collateral damage to the civil rights 
cause.  Packing the districts overwhelmingly with minorities caused 
the Supreme Court in the 1990s to greet majority-minority districts 
 
153 Black-American Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1870-Present, HIST., ART 
& ARCHIVES:  U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-
Publications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Black-American-Representatives-and-Senators-by-
Congress/ (last visited June 3, 2018). 
154 As noted, in 1975, Congress extended the VRA to forbid discrimination based on 
membership in a language minority group (Hispanic, Asians, et al.).  See supra note 25. 
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with increasing constitutional skepticism.  Contemporaneously with 
this legal development, voting dynamics changed so that white 
polarized voting against minorities’ candidate of choice abated.  
Minorities could begin to elect candidates of their choice with enough 
white votes so as to make majority-minority districts electorally 
unnecessary.155  This led the Supreme Court to declare § 4, and 
inevitably § 5 of the VRA unconstitutional, and as noted in this article, 
placed § 2 of VRA in some constitutional jeopardy. 
Worse still, the existence of packed minorities in majority-
minority districts diminished the turnout in those heavily Democratic 
districts possibly leading to a narrow electoral victory for Donald 
Trump in Wisconsin and Michigan, surely not the candidate of choice 
of the minority voters. 
The remedy for increased voter turnout in the African-
American voting districts is to increase election competition.  To 
accomplish this, it will be necessary to unpack the concentration of 
African-American voters presently located in single districts and 
spread them among more than one congressional district.  Given 
current electoral dynamics, this can be done without effectively 
jeopardizing the ability of African-Americans to elect candidates of 
their own choice consonant with § 2 of the VRA. 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore recommended that after the 2020 census, VRA 
districts be drawn to walk a fine line between increasing competition 
while still giving minorities sufficient real opportunity to elect 
candidates of their choice.  Given the state of the advanced technology 
available to effectuate accurate redistricting, the goal of giving 
minorities the ability to elect candidates of their choice without the 




155 Indeed, in the recent hotly contested U.S. Senate race in deep red Alabama, the African-
American turnout of 41% exceeded the 35% turnout of white voters.  Alan Blinder & Michael 
Wines, Black Turnout in Alabama Complicates Debate on Voting Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.  
24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/24/us/alabama-voting-blacks-.html.  The 
Democratic candidate won more than 90% of the African-American vote thus enabling him to 
win a rare narrow victory over his Republican opponent in a State which had not elected a 
Democratic Senator since 1990. 
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